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EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAWTax Aid to Education
WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S.J.*

T

HE CURRENT CONTROVERSY over federal aid to education has unfor-

obscured the real issues in many minds. Some sincere people
.tunately
seem to think it is a theological dispute between Protestants and Catholics, or Jews and Christians, or believers and unbelievers. Others seem
to consider it a philosophical debate between secular and religious theories of education. It is neither. At least it should be neither. Catholics
and Protestants, Jews and secularists are deployed on both sides of the
controversy. Moreover, we have no federal theology, and no federal
philosophy of education. Religion is mentioned in the Constitution only
to guarantee it freedom, and education is not mentioned in the Constitution at all. The current controversy is a political argument in
which, it seems to me, there are three substantial issues and one constitutional difficulty. The three substantial issues are the general welfare
of the nation, the practical freedom of parental choice in education, and
the equitable distribution of tax benefits to all school children without
discrimination. The constitutional difficulty is created by the highly
controverted interpretation of the establishment of religion clause of the
first amendment to the Constitution, announced for the first time in 1947
by the Supreme Court.'
General Welfare
The only constitutional justification for any federal aid to education is
the power given to the Congress by the first clause of article I, section 8,
of the Constitution, to provide for the "general welfare of the United
States." From the foundation of the nation there were sharp differences
of opinion as to the meaning of the general welfare clause. James Madison insisted that it amounted to no more than an introduction or reference
* A.B. (1928), A.M. (1929), Boston College; Ph.D., Gregorian University (1932);
S.T.L., Weston College (1935); LL.B. Georgetown University (1939); Professor of
Law, Loyola University School of Law, Chicago, Ill.; former Dean, Boston College
Law School.
1 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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to the specific powers enumerated in the
following clauses of the same section. 2
Alexander Hamilton, however, argued that
the general welfare clause conferred a
separate power distinct from those later
enumerated. 3 Joseph Story, in his justly
celebrated Commentaries on the Constitution, espoused the Hamiltonian position. 4
But the question was not settled for almost
:acentury and a half. In 1936, United States
v. Butler5 invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, but in the opinion
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
Madison view, and explicitly adopted the
Hamilton-Story. opinion that the general
welfare clause is a separate grant of power,
distinct from those later enumerated, not
to regulate, but to tax and spend for the
general welfare of the nation. A year later,
in 1937, the case of Steward Machine Company v. Davis6 upheld the Social Security
Act of 1935 as a legitimate exercise of this
separate general welfare power. Since then
the power has never been seriously challenged. And nobody, I suppose, would
seriously challenge the fact that the nation's
welfare depends in great part upon the
education of the nation's children. Federal
aid to education is unquestionably constitutional. Therefore, if the Congress determines to exercise its legislative discretion
to provide for the general welfare by aiding
education, it seems to me that the most important issue is this: would the general welfare of the nation be better promoted by
aiding the education of some of our children, .while ignoring others, or would it be
No. 41, at 282-83 (Law Classics
Library 1901) (Madison).
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better promoted by aiding the education of
all our children? It would seem reasonable
to hold that, if the general welfare would
be promoted by aiding some, it would be
better promoted by aiding all. In any event,
the critical question is: how would the
general welfare of the nation be better
served? This is the main issue. It should
not be obscured. And it should not be
shouted down.
Parental Freedom

There are other. important issues too.
One of them is the difficult problem of
providing more practical freedom of parental choice in education. The Supreme
Court in the Oregon School Case7 of 1925
unanimously held that "due process of
law" necessarily implied the fundamental
constitutional right of parents, subject to
reasonable state standards and regulations,
to choose the education of their own children, whether it shall be public or private,
secular or religious. Freedom of and from
religion, and freedom of educational phil.osophy, are simply parts or elements of
this fundamental parental right of free
choice in their children's education.
This is not a constitutional right of the
Catholic Church or of any other church,
or of any school system, public or private,
secular or religious. Churches and school
systems do not produce children or pay
taxes. The right is parental. A state may
compel a child to attend an accredited
school of his parents' choice. It may not
deny or unreasonably restrict the freedom
of that parental choice.

3 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES §978 (2d ed. 1851).
4..1STORY, Op. cit. supra note 3,§§976-91.

5297 U.S. 1 (1936).
G 301 U.S. 548 (1937).

Fundamental rights, obviously, should
7 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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not be mere academic abstractions or
sterile legal concepts. "To secure these
rights," in the practical context of life,
"governments are instituted among men."
Yet when government taxes all parents for
the support of a school system which satisfies the free choice of some parents only,
and denies all support to parents whose
consciences dictate otherwise, can it truly
be said to "secure" this freedom of parental
choice in the practical context of life?
Does not such a plan of taxation and disbursement create, by law, a positive economic impediment to the practical freedom
of parents who, taxed for the free choice of
others, cannot afford to pay again for their
own? And especially when their own free
choice is not a matter of eccentricity, and
not merely a matter of taste, but a matter
of respectable educational philosophy, and
particularly a matter of conscience?
This may not be a serious problem for
the wealthy. It may not entail great sacrifice
for the well-to-do. But for the poor, unless
rescued by private charity, it is the public
and effectual destruction of free choice in
the practical context of life. For very many
poor parents, the fundamental constitutional right of free choice in the education
of their children is indeed a mere academic
abstraction, a sterile legal concept, and a
practical mockery. How long can such a
"securing" of freedom commend itself to
the spirit of liberty, the sense of fairness,
and the boasted magnanimity of our
people? The critical question here is: would
federal aid to all, involving no unequal
tax burden on any, promote a more genuine freedom of parental choice in the practical context of life? This is the second
important issue. This too should not be
obscured. And it too should not be shouted
down.

Equal Protection
The third important issue, it seems to
me, is the equitable distribution of tax
benefits to all our school children without
discrimination. The core of the concept of
justice is equality. Justice cannot be explained without equality. "Equal Justice
Under Law" is the proud ideal cut deeply
into the gleaming white marble over the
entrance to our Supreme Court in Washington. Fundamental equality is implied in
the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, and is expressed
in the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth. Yet, after a century and a half
of constitutional history, we have only recently entered what might aptly be called
"the age of equal protection." The School
Segregation Cases of 1954 and subsequent
supporting decisions have demonstrated the
humility and the courage of the Supreme
Court in reversing previous error in pursuit of "Equal Justice Under Law."
We are no longer blind to all the terrible
inequalities of the bitter past. We have
caught a glimpse, at least, of a better future.
We have fixed our eyes and set our hearts
upon the glorious goal of practical equality
for all our racial and religious, ethnic and
political minorities. Should we, then, exclude from our ideal of equal protection
and treatment the school children of the
country - who -constitute the most voiceless, voteless, and unorganized minority in
the land?
It is not without significance that the
same clause of the Constitution, which
grants Congress power to provide for the
general welfare, also empowers it to "provide for the common defense." 9 Welfare
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
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and defense are obviously and substantially
interdependent. Do they have differing relationships to our school children, or to
some of them? Is there any reasonable
ground for distinguishing between summoning them all some day to the common
defense, and aiding them all now for the
general welfare, upon which the defense
may well depend? The critical question
here is: would the ideal of equal protection
and treatment of children be better attained
by aiding the education of some only, or
would it be better attained by aiding the
education of all without discrimination?
This is the third important issue. This too
should not be obscured. And this too
should not be shouted down.
Constitutionality
The general welfare, the practical freedom of parental choice in education, and
the equal treatment of school children
without discrimination, are the three main
issues in the current controversy. There
remains the constitutional difficulty. Some
admit that the general welfare, parental
freedom, and equal treatment demand federal aid for all school children, but insist
that unfortunately it cannot be granted.
Disliking a partial promotion of the general
welfare, sympathizing with parents too
poor to be free, and feeling sorry for
children excluded from the common care,
they think the situation is hopeless because
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the establishment of religion clause of the
first amendment, enunciated for the first
time in the Everson Bus Case10 of 1947.
Constitutional law scholars, however,
differ over the hopelessness of the situation.
Some substantial scholars consider the in10 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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terpretation a gratuitous obiter dictum not
necessarily determinative of future cases.
Others are convinced that, obiter dictum
or not, the interpretation is simply wrong;
that it should be, and eventually will be,
distinguished or repudiated.
The establishment clause has been before
the Court only three times in its entire
history: the Everson Bus Case" in 1947,
the McCollum Released Time Case12 in
1948, and the Zorach Released Time
Case13 in 1952. In only one of these three
cases did the Court find what it interpreted
to be an "establishment" of religion. In McCollum the Court decided that an Illinois
plan, which provided for compulsory religious instruction at parental request inside
public school buildings, Was an establishment of religion. But in Zorach the Court
decided that the New York City plan, which
provided for compulsory religious instruction at parental request outside public
school buildings, was not. In both plans the
religious instruction requested by the parents was made compulsory by law. In
neither plan, however, was there an expenditure of public funds for the religious
instruction involved.
The Everson Bus Case is the only-one
dealing with an expenditure of public funds
as an alleged establishment of religion. The
Court decided that it was not an establishment for a New Jersey township, pursuant
to a state statute, toreimburse parents for
money expended by them for bus transportation of their children to and from
parochial schools. Since public school children were transported to and from school
at public expense, the Court upheld the
11 Ibid.

12 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
13 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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New Jersey reimbursement statute as a
public welfare measure designed "to help
parents get their children, regardless of
their religion, safely and expeditiously to
and from accredited schools. '14 The statute
promoted the public welfare, fostered freedom of parental choice, and treated all
children equitably without discrimination.
The decision of the Court was that such a
law does not amount to an establishment
of religion.
However, in arriving at this decision, the
Court's opinion enunciated this highly controverted interpretation of the establishment
clause:
The "establishment. of religion" clause of
the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. . . . No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. . .-. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between church and
state."15
Despite this sweeping declaration, the
Court upheld the New Jersey statute as a
constitutional public welfare law - even
though it obviously aided Catholic parents
to get their children to parochial schools,
which are institutions which teach the practice of religion, and hence indirectly aided
the institutions themselves. In doing so,
however, the Court expressly noted that:
"The state contributes no money to the
schools. It does not support them."' 16 The
14 Everson v. Board of Educ.,

(1947).
15 Id. at 15-16.
16 Id. at 18.

330 U.S. 1, 16

opinion of the Court, written by Justice
Black, concluded as follows:
The First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state. That wall must
be kept high and impregnable. We could
not approve the slightest breach.
New Jersey
7
has not breached it here.'
This is the interpretation of the establishment clause which raises the difficulty in
promoting the general welfare, parental
freedom, and equal treatment of children,
by federal aid to the education of all school
children without discrimination. I assume
that it raises no difficulty concerning children who attend private secular schools.
But it does raise a problem concerning
children who study religion in addition to
the secular subjects required and regulated
by state law, that is, children who attend
parochial schools.
Assuming arguendo that this much disputed interpretation of establishment is not
mere obiter dictum, but that it pertains
to the ratio decidendi of the case, I subscribe to the opinion of those who claim
that it is simply wrong; that it should be,
and eventually will be, distinguished or
repudiated. I think it is wrong as a matter
of history, as a matter of logic, and as a
matter of judicial policy.
History
The interpretation is wrong as a matter
of history. The first amendment contains
two clauses concerning religion, as follows:
"Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." The establishment and the free exercise clauses should
be carefully distinguished. For the moment,
I am concerned with the establishment
17 Ibid.
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clause alone. My thesis is that, according
to the common understanding of the terms
which prevailed among the thirteen original ratifying states, "an establishment of
religion" meant any official preferment by
law of one religion over another; and that,
according to the same common understanding, the clause "Congress shall make no
law respecting" any such officially preferred
religion, was designed and intended to
forestall the possibility that the Congress
might attempt (1) to establish an officially
preferred national religion to replace or
compete with the then existing state religions, or (2) to establish, disestablish, or
interfere in any way with the then existing
state religions. That was the significance
of the words "respecting an" establishment,
federal or state.

1776: "There shall be no establishment
of any one religious sect in this State in
preference to another." In New Jersey,
the constitution of 1776: "There shall be
no establishment of any one religious sect
in this Province in preference to another."
In North Carolina, the constitution of
1776: "There shall be no establishment of
any one religious church or denomination
in this State in preference to any other."
In New York, the constitution of 1777
repealed "all laws which might be construed to establish or maintain any particular denomination of Christians or their
ministers." Note the constant recurrence
of "preference" as the significant characteristic of establishment in these solemn
and public documents.
In other states the struggle for disestab-

Although the Constitution of 1789 gave
the new federal government no express
power over religion, there was considerable
fear on the part of many that the new
federal government might attempt to do
some of these things under the guise of the
implied powers contained in the necessary
and proper clause of article I, section 8,
of the Constitution. The establishment
clause guarded against this possibility. It
was an express declaration of a principle
of federalism which guaranteed, as against
federal interference, exclusive state power
over religion. This seems clear from the
history of the times.

lishment was not yet successful. When the
first amendment was ratified, at least four
of the thirteen original states still retained
officially preferred, that is, established
religions: Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut and South Carolina. A typical
establishment provision is found in the
South Carolina constitution of 1778: "The
Christian Protestant religion shall be
deemed, and hereby is constituted and
declared to be, the established religion of
this State." I said that "at least four" of the
ratifying states still retained officially established religions, because several other
states had what might be called today
"quasi-establishments." That is: while repudiating the establishment of any one
officially preferred religion, and tolerating
the free exercise of religion in private life,
nevertheless they established certain public
or civil disabilities based upon religious
belief or worship.

For several years prior to the ratification
of the Constitution in 1789, and the first
amendment in 1791, a bitter struggle had
been waged in several of the states against
the locally established religions. In some
of the states the fight for disestablishment
had already been successful, as evidenced
by the texts of their local constitutions. In
Delaware, for instance, the constitution of

North Carolina, for instance, in its constitution of 1776, while repudiating the
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"establishment of any one religious church
...in preference to any other," nevertheless provided that only Protestants could
hold state offices. And New Hampshire,
in its constitution of 1784, while repudiating the "subordination of any one sect
or denomination to another," nevertheless
provided that the profession of Protestantism should be a qualification for the offices
of governor, state senator and representative, and empowered its legislature to
authorize municipalities to support public
Protestant teachers of piety, religion and
morality. Unless this provision has been
repealed recently, it is still in the constitution of New Hampshire - although, of
course, as dead letter in view of both
recent custom and the fourteenth amendment.
These state establishments and quasiestablishments persisted for many years
after the ratification of the first amendment,
which limited federal power only and
guaranteed state power over religion. Vermont disestablished in 1807, Connecticut
in 1818, and Massachusetts in 1833. But
the quasi-establishments, that is, the civil
disabilities based upon religious belief or
worship, lasted many decades longer.
During the struggle against state establishments and quasi-establishments, there
was a strong popular desire, on both sides
of the fight, to keep the new and feared
national government entirely out of it; to
make sure that the new and feared Congress would not attempt to establish an
officially preferred national religion to replace or compete with the then existing
state religions; and to make sure that all
legal power over religion would remain,
where it had always been, exclusively in
the states.
At the time of the ratification of the

Constitution in 1789, fear of the possible
use of the necessary and proper clause led
to the widespread popular demand for a
Federal Bill of Rights. Although some, including James Madison, argued that, since
the new federal government was one of
limited and delegated powers, a specific
Bill of Rights was unnecessary, nevertheless the popular demand led to the drafting
and ratification of the first ten amendments
in 1791.
With reference to religion in the proposed Bill of Rights, Rhode Island proposed
that "no particular religious sect or society
ought to be favored or established by law
in preference to others." New York proposed: "That the people have an equal,
natural, and inalienable right freely and
peaceably to exercise their religion, according to their conscience; and that no
religious sect or society ought to be favored
or established by law in preference to
others." Virginia proposed that "no particular religious sect or society ought to
be favored or established by law in preference to others." North Carolina, with its
quasi-establishment of Protestantism, offered a proposal identical with Virginia's.
And New Hampshire, with its own quasiestablishment of Protestantism, proposed
that: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of
conscience." This proposal, which came
close to the formal text of the eventual
amendment, evidenced New Hampshire's
desire to keep the Congress from touching
its own particular quasi-establishment! But
note, again the constant recurrence of
"preference" as the significant characteristic of an establishment of religion. It seems
fairly obvious that a law which would
treat all religions alike, such as tax exemption of -church property, would not be an

7
establishment, as the term was commonly
understood in 1791. A fortiori, a law which
would aid all school children alike would
not be an establishment of religion.
James Madison submitted his own
amendments to the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789. Two of his amendments, the fourth and fifth, dealt expressly
with the subject of religion. His fourth
amendment was to be inserted in Article I,
Section 9, of the Constitution, following the
necessary and proper clause of Section 8.
Under the caption of "Limitations upon
Powers of Congress," it read:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged
on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed.
His fifth amendment was to be inserted
in Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution.
Under the caption of "Restrictions upon
Powers of States," it read: "No State shall
violate the equal rights of conscience ......
It is evident that Madison distinguished
three things: an establishment of religion,
a quasi-establishment (civil disabilities
based upon belief or worship), and the
equal rights of conscience in private life.
The "equal rights of conscience" he would
protect against both sovereignties, national
and state. But he would prohibit establishments and quasi-establishments to the nation only; he would allow the states to
continue with them or do whatever they
desired in the matter.
Madison's proposed restriction on the
powers of the states, that "no state shall
violate the equal rights of conscience," did
not become part of the Constitution or the
Bill of Rights. Sometimes called "The
Lost Amendment," its failure emphasized
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the desire and intention of the times to
reserve all power over religion to the states.
During the debates on the drafting of
the text of the first amendment, Madison
explained that he believed "the people
feared that one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and
establish a religion to which they would
compel others to conform." He thought
that, "if the word 'national' was introduced,
it would point the amendment directly to
the object it was intended to prevent." The
word "national" was not specifically introduced, apparently for two reasons: (1)
to avoid the dispute then current as to
whether the new central government was
in fact a "national" or a federal government, a dispute which seven decades later
erupted into the Civil War, and (2) to
make it clear that the new central government had no power whatsoever over any
establishment, national or state. Joseph
Story, in his Commentaries, wrote that the
purpose of the first amendment was "to
exclude all rivalry among Christian sects,
and to prevent any national ecclesiastical
establishment which would give to any
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the
national government."' 8
The historical evidence seems conclusive that the establishment clause of the
first amendment simply forbade a national
establishment or quasi-establishment of religion. That is to say: it simply forbade
the official preferment by federal law of
one religion over others, and the setting up
by federal law of civil disabilities basedupon religious belief or worship. The
second clause of the amendment, covering
the free exercise of religion, obviously went
further and prohibited the federal govern18 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1877 (2d ed. 1851).
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ment from interfering by law with religious
belief and worship, -that is, the rights of
conscience even in private life. The two
clauses together completely removed the
matter of religion from federal competence, and left it within the exclusive
competence of the states.
When the Bill of Rights was ratified, it
was universally understood that its restrictions were limitations upon the federal
government only. This was confirmed by
the Supreme Court in 1833 in Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore,'9 a case involving
property rights and the fifth amendment.
It was further confirmed by the Court in
1844 in Permoli v. New Orleans,20 a case
involving religious rights and the first
amendment, and in which a unanimous
Court declared:
The Constitution makes no provision for
protecting the citizens of the respective
states in their religious liberties; this is left
to the state constitutions and laws; nor is
there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect
21
on the States.
The main historical point, however, is
that an "establishment of religion" meant,
to those who ratified the first amendment,
the official preferment by law of one religion over others, or the establishment by
law of civil disabilities based upon religious
belief or worship. It meant then what it
means today when we speak of the Established Church of England or the Established
Religion of Spain. It did not forbid then,
and it does not forbid now, the promotion
of the nation's general welfare, the furtherance of parental freedom, or the equal treatment of children, by means of federal aid
19 10 U.S. (7 Pet.) 464 (1833).
20 15 U.S. (3 How.) 561 (1844).
21 Id. at 563.

to the education of all the nation's school
children without discrimination or preference - including parochial school children
who study secular subjects required by law,
in schools regulated and accredited by
law. Such aid does not prefer one religion
over another. Nor does it create civil disabilities for any. It avoids disabilities and
fosters freedom. As someone has put it:
the Supreme Court may make history, it has
no mandate to rewrite it.
Logic
The interpretation is wrong as a matter
of logic. Following the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment in 1868 radically
changed relationships between the federal
and state governments. By that amendment the federal constitution, for the first
,time, provided that: "No state shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor
deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." The Permoli
and Barron cases thereby became obsolete.
Not because the first and fifth amendments
were changed, but because the fourteenth
then empowered the federal courts, for the
first time, to protect fundamental personal
rights against state action. The personal
rights so protected against state action are
described in the amendment by the very
general terms of life, liberty, property, and
equal protection.
The generality of these terms, and the
difficulty of specifying the particular personal rights embraced therein, engendered
passionate controversies and instigated an
enormous volume of constitutional litigation. The due process clause has already
received long and extensive judicial attention, especially regarding property rights,
whereas the equal protection clause is only

7
beginning to come under comparable judicial scrutiny, notably in the School Segregation Cases22 of 1954.
However, it was settled as early as 1883,
in the Civil Rights Cases,23 that the fourteenth amendment protects personal rights
against state action only. Moreover, it is
also settled that the personal rights so
protected do not include all the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights - the
right, for instance, to a jury trial in a
civil suit involving more than twenty dollars! In a long series of constitutional cases,
notably Hurtado v. California24 in 1884,
Twining v. New Jersey25 in 1908, Palko v.
Connecticut26 in 1937, Adamson v. California27 in 1947, and Wolf v. Colorado2 8 in
1949, it became the settled doctrine of the
Court that the fourteenth amendment protects against state action all and only all
personal rights which are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," without which
"neither liberty nor justice could exist,"
which are "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental" and which correspond to
,"those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of Englishspeaking peoples."
Accordingly, by a long and painstaking
process of judicial "inclusion and exclusion," many personal rights have been
"ranked as fundamental," and therefore
protected in the fourteenth amendment
against state action. Certainly, the free exercise of religion is one of these fundamental rights, and it was so held in Hamilton
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
25211 U.S. 78 (1908).
26 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
27 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
28 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
22
23
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v. Board of Regents29 in 1934, and in the
Jehovah Witness case of Cantwell v. Connecticut3" in 1940. Obviously therefore, the
official preferment by state law of one
religion over others, the creation by state
law of civil disabilities based upon religious
belief or worship, and interference by state
law with religious liberty in private life,
are forbidden by the fourteenth amendment. They are forbidden, however, not
because they are establishments or quasiestablishments of religion, but precisely
because and in so far as they are interferences with the fundamental personal
right of the "free exercise" of religion. In
view of the historical meaning of establishment and quasi-establishment, I cannot conceive of one which would not interfere with
the free exercise of religion. But the point
is this: it is the free exercise of religion
which is the fundamental personal right or
liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment.
What, then, of an alleged establishment
which does not in fact interfere with anyone's free exercise of religion? It is a
stranger to history. Or it was, at least, until the Supreme Court made the introduction in 1947. In the Everson Bus Case and
the McCollum and Zorach Released Time
Cases, there was no allegation or finding
of any interference with anyone's free exercise of religion. In all three cases, the
Court was dealing with an alleged establishment which ironically made the free
exercise of religion a more practical element
in the fundamental parental right of educational control. And in all three cases, the
Court appeared to consider this novel
constitutional concept as though it had
some historical basis. The Court appeared
29 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
30 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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to consider that, even though New Jersey,
Illinois, and New York, did not deprive
anyone of the free exercise of religion,
nevertheless in New Jersey and New York
there might have been, and in Illinois there
was, an establishment of religion in violation of personal liberty guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment.
The Court did not bother to elucidate the
judicial metamorphosis whereby the first
amendment guarantee of state power over
religion became, in 1947, a denial of that
same power in the fourteenth. The Court
did not take the trouble to explain the
judicial logic whereby a first amendment
principle of federalism became, in 1947, a
personal right in the fourteenth, and a fundamental one at that. For the fourteenth
amendment protects only fundamental personal liberty and equality. But what personal liberty or equality is violated by an
alleged establishment which actually promotes and fosters the free and equal exercise of religion by parents in controlling
the education of their children? The liberty
of the parents? The liberty of the children?
The McCollum Case held that religious
instruction at parental request inside public
school buildings in Illinois was an establishment; the Zorach Case held that religious instruction at parental request
outside public school buildings in New
York was not. Justice Jackson, in a rather
bitter dissent in Zorach, complained about
"pressuring children into religion," and
wrote:
The distinction attempted between ... [McCollum and Zorachl is trivial, almost to the

point of cynicism, magnifying nonessential
details and disparaging compulsion which
was the underlying reason for invalidity....
The wall which the Court was professing to
erect between Church and State has become

even more warped than I expected. Today's
judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and of the judicial processes than to students of constitutional law. 31
I agree with Justice Jackson that the inside-outside distinction between McCollum
and Zorach is trivial. And the Court itself
has held in- Niemotko v. Maryland32 in
1951, and in Fowler v. Rhode Island33 in
1953, that religion may not be unreasonably barred or discriminated against on
public property. But Justice Jackson's dissent is also open to criticism on the basis
of logic. When he spoke of "compulsion"
and of "pressuring children into religion,"
he must have known that the only compulsion or pressure involved was that which
was freely requested by the parents involved. Surely he did not think that
unemancipated children have a constitutionally protected freedom of or from religion as against the wishes of their parents.
Certainly he could not have been unaware
that the compulsory education laws and the
truancy regulations of all the states compel
several million children to attend parochial
schools at the free choice of their parents.
And he could not have imagined any
unemancipated child obtaining an injunction forbidding his parents to force him
even to church services! The point is that,
neither in the Illinois or the New York
released time plan, was there any compulsion or pressure upon the parents involved.
They wanted religious instruction for their
children, and they freely signed requests
therefor. That being so, just what was the
unconstitutional compulsion or pressure
which Justice Jackson found so distressing?
31Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1952)
(dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.).
32 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
33 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
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In the case of In Matter of Weberman,34
1950, a lower court of New York found
the State's power over minors sufficient to
sustain a law requiring all children, regardless of the school attended, and regardless
of the religious beliefs of the children or
their parents, to be instructed "in at least
the eleven common school branches (specified by statute) of arithmetic, reading,
spelling, writing, the English language, geography, United States history, civics, hygiene, physical training and the history of
New York State." The decision was not
appealed. Appeal would have been futile.
The Court of Appeals of New York and
the United States Supreme Court would
certainly affirm state power to require, and
to regulate reasonably, the teaching of such
secular subjects in all schools, public and
private, secular and religious. And so too
with legal requirements and qualifications
of teachers in all schools. But, if a state
may require and regulate such subjects in
all schools, why may it not support the
teaching of such subjects in all schools? If
the regulation of such subjects in parochial
schools is not an establishment of religion,
why would the support of the same subjects
be an establishment of religion? Is regulation less an establishment than support?
Support, I assume, could be refused. Regulation, in the nature of things, cannot be
refused. Can the cake be had and eaten
too? Where is the logic in saying that when
the state regulates parochial schools it is
not establishing religion, but if it should
support them, even in the teaching of secular subjects, it would be?
In the Everson Case, which upheld the
New Jersey reimbursement statute, Justice
Black went out of his way to observe that
"we do not mean to intimate that a state

could not provide transportation only to
children attending public schools." 3 5 He
did not continue far enough, however, to
observe how such discrimination, in a public welfare measure, would square with the
equal protection clause of the Amendment.
The Supreme Court, in determining what
personal rights are "to be ranked as fundamental," has referred to "those canons of
decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples." The notions of English-speaking peoples have a certain oractical value, at least,
in judging whether personal rights are
fundamental or not. Now English has been
spoken in England, Ireland, and Canada
for a considerable time. But, I dare say
that Catholics in England, Jews in Ireland,
and Protestants in Canada, would be somewhat surprised and mildly amused to be
told, on the authority of the United States
Supreme Court, that Catholicism is established in England, Judaism is established
in Ireland, and Protestantism is established
in Canada, because all those nations grant
some form of equitable aid to "confessional" schools, in accordance with the free
choice of parents and the equal treatment
of children. Is such assistance a violation
of "those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples"? Does such help violate some fundamental right "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty"? Logic is
neither truth nor justice: it could be a help
in the judicial pursuit of both.

198 Misc. 1055, 100 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct.
1950).

35 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
(1947).

34

Policy
The interpretation is wrong as a matter
of judicial policy. By this I do not mean,
of course, that the Supreme Court has any
1, 16
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authority to act in the capacity of a superlegislature to determine the legislative policies of the nation or the states. Quite the
contrary. But there are judicial policies
also. One of the most important, known as
"judicial restraint," is the policy of not
interfering with legislative policies, which
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality,
unless that presumption is clearly overcome
and the Constitution clearly commands. To
illustrate: in 1897, New York enacted a
labor statute prohibiting employees in
bakeries from working more than ten hours
a day and sixty hours a week. In 1905,
with what is now regarded as a remarkable
lack of judicial restraint, the Court in
Lochner v. New York 36 invalidated the statute. Justice Peckham, speaking for the
Court, said: "The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the
employer and employ6s. . . . 37 Therefore
it violated "the liberty of the individual
protected by the fourteenth amendment."38
The Court vindicated the liberty of bakers
to work more than ten hours a day and
more than sixty hours a week! In one of
the most famous dissents in constitutional
history, however, Justice Holmes wrote:
I think it is my duty to express my dissent.
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain. If it were a question whether
I agreed with that theory, I should desire to
study it further and long before making up
my mind. But I do not conceive that to be
my duty, because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to
do with the right of a majority to embody
their opinions in law.... The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics ....

A Constitution

is not intended to embody a particular eco-

nomic theory.... I think that the word
"liberty," in the Fourteenth Amendment, is
perverted when it is held to prevent the
natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by
39
the traditions of our people and our law.
This famous expression of the doctrine
of judicial restraint has since become the
professed policy of the Court. The Court
no longer reads into the due process clauses
of the fifth or fourteenth amendments the
particular economic theory of laissez faire
liberty of contract, which proved to be a
pretty abstract liberty and a rather sterile
freedom for the bakers of New York.
But the salutary policy of judicial restraint was forgotten, I submit, when the
Court formulated its novel concept of an
establishment of religion. One might paraphrase Justice Holmes: The fourteenth
amendment does not enact Mr. James Madison's theology or Mr. Leo Pfeffer's philosophy .... A Constitution is not intended
to embody a particular religious theory or
a particular philosophy of education. ...
I think that the word "liberty," in the fourteenth amendment, is perverted when it is
held to prevent a greater freedom of religion, a more practical freedom of parental
choice in education, and a more equitable
treatment of children without discrimination.
Another important judicial policy, which
I believe the Court ignored in interpreting
the establishment clause, is the policy of
interpreting a constitutional provision or a
statute according to the common understanding of its terms in the minds of those
who ratified or enacted it, at the time and

:36 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37
38

Id. at 53.
Ibid.

39 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76
(1905) (dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.).
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in the circumstances of its ratification or
enactment. The private writings and even
the public speeches of legislators may be
of interest in showing what they personally
intended a piece of legislation to mean or
what they personally thought it meant. It
is a pretty poor cause which cannot find
some plausible support in legislative history. The technique of "loading the legislative record" is not an unknown sophis-tication.
There is an admitted danger in qualifying the formal text of a constitution or a
statute by expressions found in the letters,
speeches, and debates of legislators who
frequently indicate only their personal and
tentative opinions or hopes in the hurlyburly give-and-take of political advocacy
and compromise. Justice Frankfurter, in
Adamson v. California,40 said: "What was
submitted for ratification was his proposal,
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wrote: "We do not inquire what the legislature meant, we ask only what the statute
means." This policy or principle of interpretation is especially important in the case
of a constitutional amendment, whose ratification requires the approval, not merely
of the Congress, but of three-fourths of
the states.
It was the legislatures of the thirteen
original states which ratified the first
amendment, and they obviously did so according to the common understanding of
an establishment of religion which prevailed throughout the states in 1791. But
this common understanding principle of interpretation was ignored by the Court, it
seems to me, in its preoccupation with the
writings of Madison and Jefferson.
Jefferson was in France when the first

amendment was ratified. His metaphor, "a
wall of separation between church and
state," was not written until eleven years
after the ratification. It appeared in a private letter of courtesy, in brief reply to the
felicitations of the Danbury Baptist Association. Yet the Court speaks of "a wall of
separation between church and state,"
whatever that polite metaphor meant, as
though it were a part of or a substitution
for the formal text of the amendment itself.
Justice Frankfurter wrote in McCollum:
"Separation means separation, not something less."14 2 This seems to me a strange
bit of judicial foot-stamping for a man who
was interested in proposals, not speeches.
The amendment says nothing about separation. Establishment means establishment,
not something less. But the Court has made
it mean a great deal less - a great deal less
than the official preferment by law of one
religion over others, or the setting up by
law of civil disabilities based upon religious
belief or worship. Justice Cardozo once
remarked that a metaphor is a dangerous
and shifting foundation for a rule of law.
Moreover, metaphor or not, the fact is that
the thirteen original states did not ratify
Thomas Jefferson's picturesque prose in
1802. They ratified the formal text of the
first amendment in 1791, according to the
common understanding of the term "establishment of religion" which prevailed
throughout the original states at that time.
Ironically enough, in his annual report
of 1822, as the Rector of the tax-supported
University of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson
advocated the construction of "religious
schools on the confines of the University,"
urging that "such establishments would
offer the further and greater advantage of

40 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
41 Id. at 64 (concurring opinion).

42 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231
(1948) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

not his speech."' 4 1 And Justice Holmes once
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enabling the students of the University to
attend religious exercises with the professor
of their particular sect," and explaining that
"such an arrangement . . . would fill the

chasm now existing, on principles which
would leave inviolate the constitutional
freedom of religion."
Those who are determined to drive every
vestige of religion out of public life, even
that segment of public life which is primarily parental and secondarily civic, prefer to quote Jefferson's private metaphor of
1802 instead of his recommendation of
1822. The recommendation of 1822
prompted Professor Alexander Meiklejohn
to point out that Thomas Jefferson should
be considered one of the earliest advocates
of the released time plan which the Supreme Court condemned in 1948 - largely
on Jefferson's metaphor of 1802! It is
highly unfortunate for the common welfare,
parental freedom, and the equitable treatment of school children, that the Court
reached for an ex post facto metaphor instead of its own professed policies of judicial restraint and judicial interpretation by
the common understanding of ratified
terms.
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the establishment clause
produced a particularly bitter result in a
recent Vermont case. The town of South
Burlington, Vermont, has no public high
school of its own. In accordance with a
Vermont statute, the South Burlington
School District had been paying the tuition
of its children at neighboring public high
schools and at accredited private high
schools, secular or religious, according to
the free choice of tax-paying parents. On
January 3, 1961, the Supreme Court of
Vermont, feeling constrained by the opin-ions in Everson, McCollum and Zorach,

43
decided, in the case of Anderson v. Swart,
that the fourteenth amendment forbids the
South Burlington School District, despite
the authorizing statute, to pay the tuition
of South Burlington children at Rice Memorial High School and Mount Saint
Mary's Academy or any other "sectarian
school within or without the State."
As a result, the fundamental personal
liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment now means that South Burlington
parents may no longer choose accredited
religious high schools for their children,
unless they are financially able to pay
twice, or are succored by private charity.
Those who still so choose must continue,
of course, to pay taxes to provide tuition
for other parents' children at public high
schools out of town. It is interesting to note
that Walter 0. Anderson, the parent whose
name appears (because alphabetically
first) in Anderson et al. v. Swart,44 happens to be a non-Catholic whose son attends the Catholic Rice Memorial High
School in South Burlington.
Out of a total of 42,429 public school
systems in the United States, 21,646 did
not have any secondary school facilities in
1960. The Vermont decision does not, of
course, control beyond the borders of that
state. But, if followed in other states, it
could effectively curtail the practical freedom of many thousands of parents, and
effectively deprive many more ,thousands
of school children of the equal protection
of the laws. In deciding Anderson v.
Swart,45 the Vermont Supreme Court said:

Considerations of equity and fairness have
exerted a strong appeal to temper the severity of the mandate. The price it demands
Vt. -, 167 A.2d 514, cert. denied, 6 L. Ed.
2d 384 (1961).
43
44

Ibid.

45 Ibid.
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frequently imposes heavy burdens on the
faithful parent. He shares the expense of
maintaining the public school system, yet
in loyalty to his child and his belief seeks
religious training for the child elsewhere.
But the same fundamental law which protects the liberty of a parent to reject the
public system in the interests of his child's
spiritual welfare, enjoins the state from participating in the religious education he has
selected.... Equitable considerations, however compelling, cannot override existing
constitutional barriers. Legislatures and
courts alike cannot deviate from the fundamental law.4 6
"The fundamental law," according to the
court, "enjoins the state from participating
in the religious education," selected by the
parent, even to the extent of supporting the
secular subjects required and regulated by
law. But the court does not bother to explain how "the same fundamental law" permits the state to participate "in the religious
education," selected by the parent, to the
extent of requiring and regulating by law
those same secular subjects. The law
makes many distinctions. Some of them,
because of the complexity of human life,
are very subtle and refined. But the distinction between secular and religious subjects in education is a very simple and
practical one. It does not overpower the
legal mind. The law of every state draws
this distinction in requiring and regulating
the teaching and teachers of secular subjects in religious schools. What intellectual
inhibition prevents the judicial mind from
applying the same distinction concerning
support that it applies so easily concerning
regulation? What is the constitutional difference between participation by support
and participation by regulation? Is cost
accounting a stranger to the law? Or too
46

Anderson v. Swart, supra note 43 at -, 167
A.2d at 520,cert. denied, 6 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1961).
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mysterious for judicial comprehension? One
thing is a mystery: how there can be an
establishment of religion in state or federal
aid to the teaching of secular subjects in
all schools without discrimination, and yet
no establishment of religion in governmental regulation of the same subjects in all
schools without discrimination.
The Vermont Supreme Court had the
grace to concede that its concept of fundamental liberty in the fourteenth amendment is something less than equitable and
fair. "Equitable considerations, however
compelling, cannot override existing constitutional barriers." The existing constitutional barriers were erected by the United
States Supreme Court in Everson, McCollum and Zorach, by its erroneous interpretation and transference of the establishment
clause to the fourteenth amendment.
Since the historical meaning of the establishment clause is the official preferment by
law of one religion over others, or the creation by law of civil disabilities based upon
religious belief or worship, the Vermont
decision comes close to being an "establishment of non-religion." Parents who
choose to send their children to accredited
religious schools, because of religious belief
and worship, and are able to do so, are
now civilly disabled from sharing in the
common educational funds for which they
are still taxed. This is preferment by law
of non-religion.
On March 29, 1961, in an effort to
re-examine the "existing constitutional barriers," a petition for a writ of certiorari to
the Vermont Supreme Court was filed in
the Supreme Court of the United States.
On May 15, 1961, the petition was denied.4 T The public welfare, the practical
freedom of parents in education, and the
47 Anderson v. Swart, 6 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1961).
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• equitable treatment of all school children
without discrimination, will have to wait
awhile.

opinion exists among us concerning the best

way to train children for their place in society. Because of these differences and because
of reluctance to permit a single, iron-cast
system of education to be imposed upon a
nation compounded of so many strains, we

Other Considerations
In addition to the foregoing constitutional difficulty, other objections have been
raised against tax aid to the education of
all school children. There are some who
assert that such aid would be divisive of
national unity, that it would increase religious tensions, and that it would pose a
threat to our civil liberties. I offer brief
comment on these objections.
Divisiveness
It 'is said that such aid would be divisive
of national unity. In view of the fact that
tax aid to some, excluding others, is so
obviously divisive in the sense of being
discriminatory and arousing the bitterness
which discrimination always engenders, it
is difficult to understand the divisiveness of
aid to all without discrimination. Unless,
of course, it rests upon an implication that
religious schools are divisive per se. Unless,
that is, it stems from the conviction that
religious schools themselves are something
less than American, to be tolerated perhaps
for those who can afford them, but to be
legally discouraged and economically handicapped in the interests of real Americanism. It is not easy to be patient with this
relic of nineteenth century religious and
political bigotry. Suffice it to say that, if
religious schools are divisive per se, the
divisiveness is a fundamental constitutional
right in our pluralistic society. For we are
a pluralistic, not a monolithic, society. Justice Frankfurter wrote in 1940, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis:4 s
Great diversity of psychological and ethical

have held that, even though public educa-

tion is one of our most cherished democratic
institutions, the Bill of Rights bars a state
from compelling all children to attend the
49
public schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
Some religious schools may be divisive.
Some public schools may also be divisive.
The shameful history of racial segregation
in our schools does not show, I dare say,
that invidious divisiveness is a peculiar attribute of one type of school. The peaceful
and friendly coexistence of public and religious school systems in our great cities
should lay the ghost of the "divisiveness"
argument.
Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini were vigorous opponents of divisiveness. But the national unity of the United States is not,
thank God, the unity of dictatorship. It is
not conformism by the bayonet or the concentration camp. Neither is it the amorphous homogeneity of the melting-pot. It
is the harmonious coexistence, and cooperation for the common good, of a free
people with theological, philosophical, political and institutional differences. As Justice Jackson said in 1943, in the flag salute
case of West Virginia Board of Educ. v.
Barnette:5 0 "Compulsory unification of
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard."
Religious Tensions
It is said that such aid would increase
religious tensions. This plea has a familiar
ring. It is heard most frequently in the fight
Id. at 598-99.
50 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
49

Ts 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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for racial justice. We have been urged to
play down the racial issue because racial
tensions have increased since the Supreme
Court reversed itself in 1954. It is true that
racial tensions have increased since the
School Segregation Cases.5 1 The return to
barbarism in Little Rock and New Orleans,
and recently in Birmingham and Montgomery, show the fact. There would be no
racial tensions if racists could enjoy without
protest the privileges and preferences of
white supremacy, and if Negroes would
docilely accept the discouragements and
disabilities of second-class citizenship for
themselves and their children. Yet increased
racial tensions, tragic and savage in some
of their manifestations, are the signs and
the price of progress. They are the growing
pains of racial justice and of eventual racial
peace. I salute the courage and the heroism
of the American Negro. It seems incredible
to me to argue that, because the anger of
racists is aroused, the Negro should give
up his long and laudable struggle for liberty
and equality for himself and his children.
And so with equal aid to all school children. Two of the basic issues are parental
freedom, including religious liberty, and the
equal treatment of children. These are not
merely fundamental issues of justice and
constitutional rights. They are also the wellsprings of profound and noble human emotions. They cannot forever be ignored by
legislators, judges or the public at large.
The faithful parent cannot forever acquiesce in 'the practical limitation of his religious liberty. The responsible parent cannot
forever agree to the practical restriction of
his freedom to choose the education of his
child. The devoted parent cannot forever
be satisfied to see his child excluded from
the common care and the general welfare
51 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of a democratic society. In fact, the more
faithful, the more responsible, the more devoted, -and the more democratic a parent
is, then the more bitterly he will resent, and
-the more insistently he will fight, the inequality visited by law upon his child.
It seems to me that the parents of children in parochial schools could and should
draw courage and strength from the example of their heroic Negro brethren in the
fight for liberty and equality. It seems incredible to me to argue that, because some
folks get awfully angry at the thought of
equal treatment for all school children, the
parents of excluded children should quit
the fight for equality. Is this the counsel of
prudence? Prudence is not a dirty word for
cowardice. Courage appears to be the virtue most needed for the eventual triumph
of this just and liberal cause. It may be that
many parents think the cause is hopeless.
Undoubtedly many Negroes once thought
that the "equal but separate" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson 2 in 1896 was a hopeless obstacle to eventual justice. But fiftyeight years later the Supreme Court
reversed Plessy in the School Segregation
Cases. It was a long struggle. But justice,
especially in a democracy, is never hopeless.
Civil Liberties
It is said that such aid would pose a
threat to civil liberties. Again, it is difficult
to understand such a threat arising out of
more practical religious liberty, more practical parental freedom, and more equitable
treatment of children. However, an eminent
law professor once said to me that, whatever the merits of the constitutional issue,
he feared a danger to civil liberties in tax
aid to religious education. To the best of
my recollection, he put it this way:
52 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Analyzing my position, I suppose it is based
on emotion. The emotion is fear. The fear
is of organized religion. For the history of
organized religion is the history of kicking other people around. Tax aid would
strengthen religious schools. Strengthened
religious schools would increase the power
of organized religion. Organized religion
would then exercise its rights exuberantly.
The exuberance would threaten the civil liberties of others.
The professor shall remain anonymous
because the conversation was private.
Moreover, I cannot be certain of a completely accurate recall of his exact words.
The sentiment expressed, however, was
candid and honest. I recount it because it
reflects the feelings of many sincere people,
misguided as I believe them to be.
It cannot be denied that the religious
wars of 16th and 17th century Europe, and
the religious bigotry of 18th and 19th century America, provide an historical background for a fear of organized religion
"kicking other people around." History
provides a background for a fear of organized government making exuberant use of
its feet too. Less than a hundred years ago,
in the land of the free and the home of the
brave, we maintained the savage abomination of human slavery.
The historical background is a compelling reason for guarding against any official
preferment by law of one religion over
others, against any creation of civil disabilities based upon religious belief or worship, against any infringement of the free
and equal rights of conscience. The first
and fourteenth amendments were ratified
precisely to do this. The historical background is no reason, however, for an official preferment by law of non-religion over
religion, or -the creation of civil disabilities
based upon parental choice of religious

education for children. This is what the
Supreme Court's current interpretation of
the establishment clause does in practical
effect.
Was there any exuberant pedal activity
in South Burlington, Vermont, when all
parents could freely choose -the education
of their children, and all children could
share equally in the community's concern
for education? Who is kicking whom? The
argument that aid to the education of all
children would endanger our civil liberties
seems to ignore some very precious ones.
It seems to imply .that parents of children
in religious schools should be kept in second-class citizenship for fear that, if granted
first-class citizenship, they would abuse it.
And all in the name of civil liberties, God
save the mark! The fear of the abuse of
liberty has a long and pitiful career in the
denial of liberty. Civil liberties, it seems to
me, are better protected when they are
allowed to exist in everyday life.
Liberalism, as a political philosophy, advocates the maximum of freedom consistent
with equal justice and social order. Moreover, it evaluates freedom, justice, equality
and order, not in academic abstractions or
sterile legal concepts, but in the practical
context of social life. It argues for legal
restrictions only in the interests of a larger
practical freedom in the complex political,
economic, industrial, technological and social circumstances of a dynamic society. It
is sensitive to social injustice and lack of
real freedom. It is seldom satisfied with
things as they are. It does not fear change
and experiment, as conditions change or as
freedom can be better served. And the test
is pragmatic. Liberals supported the New
York bakers in their fight for a maximum
hour law, not in the interest of an abstract
and futile "liberty of contract," but to se-
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cure for the bakers some real justice and
some pragmatic freedom in the cruel competitive conditions of their industrial life in
1897. 1 subscribe to the liberal political
philosophy.
I am amazed, therefore, that some professed liberals are indifferent to the economic conditions which pragmatically
impede the freedom of poor parents to
choose the education of their children. I
am shocked .that some professed liberals
look with equanimity upon the pragmatically unequal treatment of school children.
Children have no votes, but they are people. Are these professed liberals "selective"
in their liberalism? Is it that they cannot
make up their minds who they are liberal
for? Or against? Are they the victims of
some occult schizophrenia which puts some
parents and some children beyond the pale
of their liberalism?
I can understand a certain conservative
position which sees no evil and no problems of freedom, which is complacent with
things as they are, which abhors change,
which is afraid of rocking the boat, which
is satisfied to muddle through somehow;
and which is not unappreciative of the tax
advantage enjoyed at the expense of an
over-burdened and out-voted minority. But
the general welfare, the practical freedom
of parental choice, and the equal treatment
of school children isclearly'and obviofsly
a liberal cause. Where are some of the liberals hiding? Surely they are not afraid of
an unpopular liberal cause. Not the liberals!
I have a profound reverence for the Supreme Court of the United States, a sincere
respect for the Justices who sit on its bench,
and a genuine affection for those whom I
have been privileged to know personally.
The history of the Court is a tale of independence, intelligence and integrity. It is
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not, of course, a saga of infallibility. But
the Court, on numerous occasions, has
proved its courage and its humility by reversing previous errors in resolute pursuit
of "Equal Justice Under Law." The most
inspiring example of its courage and humility in the present century was its monumental decision in the School Segregation
Cases53 of 1954, reversing the 1896 case
of Plessy v. Ferguson.5 4 The reversal can
be attributed to the Court's own scholarship and the fact that the Court, while not
subject to political pressure, is amenable
to the scholarship of the legal profession.
The Court is totally dedicated to the Constitution of the United States and the rule
of human reason.
While I am convinced that the Court's
current interpretation of the establishment
clause of the first amendment, and its transference to the . fourteenth, is wrong as a
matter of history, as a matter of logic, and
as a matter of judicial policy, nevertheless
I am confident that some day the Court will
see fit to permit the federal government
and the states to provide for the general
welfare, the practical freedom of parents,
and the equal treatment of children, by
aiding the education of all school children
without discrimination. I am sure that some
day the Court will sanction such aid along
the principles of the "G. I. Bill of Rights, '55
53 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55 The

constitutionality of the "G. I. Bill of
Rights" has never been reviewed by the Supreme
Court. It was never litigated because nobody had
the "standing to sue." Massachusetts v. Mellon
and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
involving the Federal Maternity Act of 1921, established the principle that no state and no taxpayer has legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of an expenditure from the general funds
of the United States. The fact that nobody tried

(Continued on page 242)
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he is bound by Christian love for his
fellow man to try to effect a reconcilia-
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tion of the embittered spouses if the
marriage is valid.
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THOMAS MORE

(Continued)

(Continued)

which contributed so tremendously in recent history to the general welfare, with
freedom and equality for all, and without
dividing the national unity, increasing religious tensions, or endangering civil liberties. The cause is just. The Court is fair.
The result will come. Some day there will
be "Equal Justice Under Law."

as informally or as publicly as each might
desire, preferred to climb to renown by
formal challenges to all comers. Rudeness
and self-centredness, rather than plain conceit, incurred this reaction; and if More was
rather deadly, in a strictly professional way,
he covered his own rudeness with a heavy
and diplomatic cloak. 51 Naturally he had
the best of it. But it is clear that he did not
share the pleasure as ninety-nine out of
a hundred people would have done. He
told the facts, we may be sure, but the
52
key to the whole thing he kept to himself.

to do so, in the case of the "G. I. Bill of Rights,"
suggests also, it seems to me, the direction ofthe
decencies. But the fact is that the "G. I. Bill of
Rights" involved tuition grants, not merely to religious schools and colleges, but also to Protestant
and Catholic seminaries and Jewish rabbinical
schools for the education of veterans studying to
be ministers, priests and rabbis.
In attempting to solve the current constitutional
problem, several plans have been suggested involving tax credits or deductions for money spent
for tuition at private accredited schools. Such
plans would seem to give relief to those only who
need it least. Take the case of two parents who
have four children, with the father earning $3,600
annually. At $600 a person, the father already has
tax exemptions totalling $3,600, his entire income!
If we are not to relinquish the principles of the
graduated income tax, where is his practical freedom of parental choice, and how equally will his
four children be treated? Or does it matter?

51 On More's habit in actual disputation see testi-

monies gathered in
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140-42 (Hitchcock and
Chambers ed., London, 1932).
52 The joke would have been appreciated by Rastell and Roper, who both wrote about More. Since
Roper does not mention the story we can be sure
that More did not tell him the key to it. If he
did not tell his son-in-law and close confidant he
did not tell anybody. The silence of Harpsfield is
even more significant, for he knew Roper, More's
other legal friends, and the tales circulating about
More's cleverness, and he was a learned civilian,
which Roper certainly was not.
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